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On a chilly November morning in late 2020, on the misty hills
outside Kalbajar, Azerbaijan, Kanum and Volodya Grigoryan
worked briskly with their friends and family to load up their truck.1
After fitting everything they could (the family sofa, their woodburning stove, and Kanum’s roses, dug up and placed in plastic
water jugs), they had a quick lunch finished up with some
homemade vodka.2 “Let’s drink to our heroes,” Kanum said, as
everyone raised their glasses.3 “They killed so many of our young
people in the war. I just want peace.”4 As Volodya locked their
front door for the last time, the family fled, not wanting to wait for
the inevitable return of their home’s previous owners, who had
likely made a similar exit two decades prior.5
The Grigoryan family left their home due to a Russian brokered
peace agreement that brought a halt, for the time being, to several
† J.D. Candidate 2022, University of North Carolina School of Law. Executive Editor,
North Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 Kristen Chick, In Nagorno-Karabakh, People Grapple with War’s Aftermath and
COVID-19, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nationalgeographic.com
/history/article/nagorno-karabakh-people-grapple-war-aftermath-covid
[https://perma.cc/U98U-QV7V].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id.
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weeks of deadly fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops
along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.6 The deal required Armenia
to hand certain areas over to Azerbaijan, including Kalbajar, the
town where the Grigoryans had lived for the past twenty years.7 The
outbreak of war in late 2020 marked the most serious period of
conflict in the region since Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the 1994
Bishkek Protocol, a provisional ceasefire agreement.8 However, the
period between the 1994 and 2020 ceasefires was marked by
ongoing tensions that often boiled over into violence.9
The cause of this ongoing conflict is the roughly 4,000 square
kilometer region of Nagorno-Karabakh, located in Azerbaijan but
with a population that, at the beginning of the dispute, was over
three-quarters Armenian.10 Throughout much of the twentieth
century, Soviet rule muted ethnic tensions.11 However, in 1988, as
the policy of perestroika permitted a resurgence of open
nationalism, the regional government of Armenia responded to a
wave of public demonstrations by formally requesting that the
central Soviet government, and the constituent Azerbaijan and
Armenian SSRs, transfer the region to the latter.12 While the
Armenian SSR endorsed the proposal, this request was rejected by

6 See Azerbaijani Army Enters Kalbajar, Region Returned by Armenia, AL JAZEERA
(Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/25/azerbaijani-army-enterskalbajar-region-returned-by-armenia [https://perma.cc/E2EL-C9FP].
7 See id.; Chick, supra note 1.
8 Thomas D. Grant, Frozen Conflicts and International Law, 50 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
361, 381 (2017); Azerbaijani Army Enters Kalbajar, Region Returned by Armenia, supra
note 6.
9 See, e.g., Fatal Armenian-Azeri Border Clash, BBC (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7278483.stm [https://perma.cc/4W3V-CL5W]; Three
Azerbaijani Soldiers Killed Near Nagorno-Karabakh, RFE/RL (Feb. 18, 2010),
https://www.rferl.org/a/Three_Azerbaijani_Soldiers_Killed_Near_NagornoKarabakh/19
62175.html [https://perma.cc/4HDQ-U46F]; Sara Khojoyan & Zulfugar Agayev,
Azerbaijan-Armenia Border Skirmishes Turn Deadliest in 20 Years, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1,
2014),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-01/azerbaijan-armeniaborder-skirmishes-turn-deadliest-in-20-years
[https://perma.cc/FEB8-EWQA];
Azerbaijan: Two Servicemen Killed in Clashes With Armenian Army, RFE/RL (Mar. 28,
2016), https://www.rferl.org/a/karabakh-azerbaijani-soldier-killed-armenia
/27640267.html [https://perma.cc/WGW9-ZLNH].
10 Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 135, ¶¶ 12-13.
11 See Heiko Krüger, Nagorno-Karabakh, in SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 214, 215 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2014).
12 Id.; Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 14.
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the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Azerbaijani government.13
Over the next few years, popular demonstrations by Armenians
continued in favor of unification, now accompanied by armed
clashes even after the deployment of Soviet troops to keep the
peace.14 Once the USSR collapsed and Soviet forces withdrew from
the area, “the conflict gradually escalated into a full-scale war.”15
This Note will consider the question at the heart of the NagornoKarabakh conflict: whether Nagorno-Karabakh has legally declared
independence from Azerbaijan. This question is of critical
importance for establishing a lasting peace, as its answer informs
whether Nagorno-Karabakh’s ethnic-Armenian leadership should
be considered a proper party to negotiations and whether that
leadership has the legal right to decide on unification with Armenia.
Part I will begin with a historical overview of the conflict, helping
set the stage for the legal discussion to follow. Part II will consider
Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to secede under Soviet law, as the
territory may have still been under USSR rule when it initially
declared independence, a distinction which has potential
ramifications under an international law analysis. Part III will then
examine Nagorno-Karabakh’s secession claims under international
law, and whether Nagorno-Karabakh can properly be considered an
independent state. Finally, Part IV will look at the future
implications of these determinations, in particular the effects on
international law if Nagorno-Karabakh becomes recognized as a
state in violation of international law.
I. Historical Background
To achieve a proper understanding of the current conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh, the historical roots of the conflict must be
considered.16 In the early sixteenth century, the area now governed
by Armenia and Azerbaijan was conquered by the Persian Safavid
Empire, which divided the region into four administrative districts,
including Karabakh, ruled by Armenian nobility.17 By the mid-

Chiragov, 2015-III Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶¶ 15-16.
15 Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
16 OHANNES GEUKJIAN, ETHNICITY, NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH
CAUCASUS: NAGORNO-KARABAKH AND THE LEGACY OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY 37
(2012).
17 Id.
13
14
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eighteenth century, Persian power in the region declined enough
that the Armenian nobility began engaging in power struggles
amongst themselves, which enabled an outsider to come in and take
control.18 In the early 1750s, Turk chieftain Panah Ali claimed
control over the area of present-day Nagorno-Karabakh and created
the khanate of Shushi-Karabagh.19 This development prompted the
Armenian nobility to petition Catherine the Great of Russia “to
liberate them from Persian domination.”20
Though it probably took longer than the Armenians in Karabakh
would have liked, Russia did eventually conquer and annex the
khanate of Shushi-Karabagh at the turn of the nineteenth century, as
part of broader imperial expansion in the Caucasus.21 At the time
of Russia’s arrival in the area, Karabakh’s population was largely
Armenian, and there were attempts by Armenian leaders to create
an Armenian state by uniting Karabakh with other Armenian
lands.22 This plan did not materialize, however, as the Russian
administration opposed the creation of ethnically homogeneous
units.23
Utilizing a ‘divide and rule’ political strategy to consolidate
their power in the region, Russia hoped to “neutralize national
demands by mixing and opposing ethnic groups.”24 As a result,
Russia included the mountainous Karabakh region in an
administrative division mainly comprising the “steppes and plains
which would become the Soviet republic of Azerbaijan in the
twentieth century,” rather than attaching Karabakh to the other
mountainous, mainly ethnic-Armenian lands of which it would
seem a more natural part.25 The Russians’ political strategy, “which
ignored the geographical and historical boundaries of the local
ethnic communities . . . became a primary factor in ethnic
confrontations in the second half of the nineteenth century.”26
Id. at 38.
Patrick Donabedian et al., THE CAUCASIAN KNOT, THE HISTORY & GEOPOLITICS OF
NAGORNO-KARABAGH 51, 74 (Levon Chorbajian et al. eds., 1994).
20 GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 38.
21 See Donabedian, supra note 19, at 78.
22 See GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 38.
23 Donabedian, supra note 19, at 78.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 78-79.
26 GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 39.
18
19
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Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Karabakh’s de jure connection with Azerbaijani territories created
real, de facto linkages that would later prove difficult to sever
cleanly.27 By linking the rugged terrain of Karabakh with flatter
land to its east, economic and transportation ties between the
previously geographically separated areas became stronger.28 These
important economic links would later be used to support arguments
that Karabakh was economically dependent on Azerbaijan, and
should therefore be included within Azerbaijan as part of the Soviet
Union.29
Additionally, these growing practical connections
“gradually generated among the Azerbaijanis an emotional and
nationalistic affinity for the region.”30
Although tensions remained throughout the nineteenth century
due to the Armenians’ rebuffed attempts to unite Karabakh with
greater Armenia, events in the region related to the First World War
would be a foreshadowing of more serious conflict to come.31 From
1915 until at least the end of the war in 1918, nearly one million
Armenians were killed by the Ottoman Turkish empire.32 The
tensions already present in the Karabakh region intensified as a
result of the genocide because “the Azerbaijanis were Muslims and
were viewed as Turks by the Armenians.”33 Into this morbid mix,
the Russian revolution introduced a power vacuum as imperial
Russia was no longer able to assert its power in the region.34
Various groups attempted to fill this vacuum, with both Armenians
and Azerbaijanis declaring control over Nagorno-Karabakh.35
However, in 1920, “the Russian Red Army invaded the Southern
Caucasus and expanded Bolshevist rule throughout the whole
region,” and the entire area quickly became part of the Soviet

See id. at 40.
Id.
29 See id.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 47.
32 See Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and International
Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, 14
YALE J. INT’L L. 221, 223-24 (1989).
33 GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 47.
34 See id. at 51.
35 Krüger, supra note 11, at 215.
27
28
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Union.36
When the Communists took control in 1920, the government of
the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan “promised that Karabagh would
be ceded to Soviet Armenia.”37 Indeed, in July of 1921, the
Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (“Kavbiuro”),
which Moscow had installed as overseer of the region, “resolved to
attach Mountainous Karabagh to Soviet Armenia.”38 However, the
Kavbiuro changed course two days later, and, citing Karabakh’s
important economic ties to Azerbaijan, decided that the territory
would remain within Soviet Azerbaijan, although it would be given
broad autonomy.39 This reversal was no doubt a result of the Soviet
leadership’s recognition of the benefits inherent in following
Russia’s previous divide and rule strategy. By keeping the majority
Armenian region within Soviet Azerbaijan, “it would forever
remain a sore spot between the two republics that would ensure
Moscow’s position as power broker.”40
Whatever the Soviets’ motives for keeping Karabakh part of
Azerbaijan, the next several decades passed with comparative
tranquility, despite repeated requests from Soviet Armenia that
Karabakh be transferred to their Republic.41 However, by 1988, the
USSR’s new policy of perestroika led to the resurgence of
nationalist movements across the country.42 On 20 February 1988,
the government of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(“NKAO”) adopted a resolution demanding “the transfer of the
[NKAO] from [Soviet Azerbaijan] to [Soviet Armenia].”43 In
Armenia, this development was met with mass demonstrations to
support the demand that Karabakh be transferred to Soviet
Armenia.44 Moscow immediately refused the Armenian request,
and sent Soviet “peacekeeping forces” into Nagorno-Karabakh to

Id.
Ronald G. Suny, Nationalism and Democracy in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union: The
Case of Karabagh, 28 MICH. Q. REV. 481, 483 (1989).
38 Id.
39 See id.
40 PATRICIA CARLEY, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, NAGORNO-KARABAKH: SEARCHING FOR A
SOLUTION 1 (1998).
41 Krüger, supra note 11, at 215.
42 See id.
43 GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 141.
44 See id.
36
37
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ease the inter-ethnic tensions.45 However, despite the military
presence within Nagorno-Karabakh itself, anti-Armenian violence
broke out across Azerbaijan, killing dozens and wounding
hundreds.46
Over the next several years, armed conflict would ebb and flow,
with the Soviet troops in the region preventing an escalation to allout war.47 On 30 August 1991, Azerbaijan formally declared its
independence from the Soviet Union, which was quickly followed
by a similar declaration by the NKAO, which announced the
establishment of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (the “NKR”)
and “declared that it was no longer under Azerbaijani
jurisdiction.”48 Several months later, in December 1991, the Soviet
Union collapsed, which resulted in the Soviet peacekeeping troops
withdrawing from the region, and military control of NagornoKarabakh being handed over to the ethnic-Armenians in the
territory.49 As Soviet troops pulled out, Azerbaijani forces “took
control of Soviet rocket launchers, tanks and ammunition and
started their attacks to besiege [Nagorno-Karabakh].”50 By early
1992, the war in Nagorno-Karabakh “had already been transformed
from an internal matter of the former USSR to a full-scale war
between two independent sovereign states, Armenia and
Azerbaijan.”51
After several years of conflict, with tens of thousands dead and
hundreds of thousands displaced, a Russian brokered ceasefire
agreement, the Bishkek Protocol, was signed by Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and the NKR on 5 May 1994.52 The war saw the ethnicArmenians of Nagorno-Karabakh gain the upper hand and increase
their territorial holdings.53 Despite the ceasefire, armed conflict has
continued to break out over the years, perhaps most notably in
2020.54 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

See id. at 145.
See id. at 147-48.
See Chiragov v. Armenia, App. No. 13216/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 4 (2015).
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 189.
Id.
See Chiragov, App. No. 13216/05 at 6.
See Grant, supra note 8, at 381.
See Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
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(“OSCE”) continues to attempt negotiations on the matter.55 As it
currently stands, “Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized as an
independent and sovereign State by [Armenia, Azerbaijan, nor
Russia], nor by any other country.”56
At present, the “most contentious issue” in these negotiations
between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains what is to become of
Nagorno-Karabakh.57 The broader global community has been
unwilling to recognize the NKR because of a reluctance to
condone the changing of inter-state borders because, “that might
lead to irredentist claims elsewhere and add to conflict rather than
[preserve] international order.”58
In this context, the question of whether the NKR’s independence
is legal under international law has particular salience. If the NKR’s
independence is indeed proper, yet the international community
nevertheless continues to withhold recognition in favor of political
expediency, the situation raises serious questions regarding the very
legitimacy of international law as a global institution. Conversely,
if future political considerations lead states to recognize the NKR
independence despite its violation of international law, the same
difficult question arises.
II. Right to Secession under Soviet Law
The question of the NKR independence’s legitimacy begins
with an analysis of the Soviet laws of secession. If the NKR had
legally declared independence from the USSR in 1991, then
subsequent Azerbaijani claims of control over the region should be
unenforceable, as the NKR would have been its own sovereign and
thus not within Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction. However, if the NKR had
not properly secured its independence under the Soviet constitution
prior to Azerbaijan declaring its own independence from the USSR,
then Nagorno-Karabakh would have become a constituent part of
the Republic of Azerbaijan and would thus need to follow

https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict
[https://perma.cc/4NKC-HQA2] (last visited Oct. 25, 2021); OSCE Minsk Group ready to
organize meeting of Azerbaijani, Armenian leaders, TASS, https://tass.com
/world/1347449 [https://perma.cc/5MRM-LA2P] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
55 See id.
56 See id. at 383.
57 GEUKJIAN, supra note 16, at 207.
58 Id. at 208.
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Azerbaijani constitutional procedures in order to achieve
independence.
On 2 September 1991, the NKAO began its attempt at
independence with the adoption of the “Declaration of
Independence of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabagh.”59 NKAO
officials based the legitimacy of this action on the Soviet Law of 3
April 1990, “[o]n the Procedures of Resolution of Problems on the
Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR,” which arguably
provided that “the secession of a Soviet Republic from the body of
the USSR allows an autonomous region within the territory of the
same republic to trigger its own process of independence.”60
Over the next several months, the NKAO prepared a referendum
on independence, which was finally held on 10 December 1991
under the approval of international observers, as the Soviet Law on
secession required that a “[r]eferendum on independence in a Union
Republic that includes autonomous republics, autonomous regions
or autonomous oblasts should be organized separately for each
autonomous entity.”61 Although this referendum showed almost
unanimous support for secession, the Azerbaijanis, who remained
in the NKAO, boycotted the vote.62 Aware of the impending
boycott, NKAO officials adopted an Act on Referendum the same
day as the vote, “which confirmed the fact that 22,747 persons of
Azerbaijani origin who did not participate in the referendum were
previously notified and given the appropriate documents on the
referendum.”63 In light of this referendum, on 6 January 1992, the
leadership of the self-proclaimed republic adopted the “Declaration
on State Independence of the Republic of Nagorny Karabakh,” a
declaration which would “form the basis for the elaboration of the
Constitution and Legislation of Nagorny Karabakh.”64
To determine the effectiveness of the NKR’s independence
process, it is necessary to consult the Soviet laws as they existed in
late 1991. Article 72 of the Constitution of the Soviet Union stated

59 U.N. ESCOR, THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND ITS
APPLICATION TO PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL OR ALIEN DOMINATION OR FOREIGN
OCCUPATION, at 7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/G/23 (2005).
60 Id.
61 Id. at 8.
62 See Grant, supra note 8, at 381.
63 U.N. ESCOR, supra note 59, at 8.
64 Id.
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that “[e]ach Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede
from the USSR.”65 Although this provision would seem to
immediately quash the NKAO’s right to freely secede as they
existed at a lower administrative level than a Union Republic,
NKAO officials had relied on Article 3 of the Law of Secession
passed by the Soviet government in April 1990, which stated, “[t]he
people of autonomous republics and autonomous formations retain
the right to decide independently the question of remaining with the
USSR or within the seceding Union republic, and also to raise the
question of their own state-legal status.”66
Thus, the question arises as to whether the Law of Secession
was truly meant to augment Article 72 of the constitution, or
whether Article 3 of the Law of Secession was at odds with the
constitution. If the two authorities were in conflict, the constitution
would have supremacy as Article 173 of the Soviet constitution
states, “The Constitution of the USSR shall have supreme legal
force. All laws and other acts of state bodies shall be promulgated
on the basis of and in conformity with it.”67 Ultimately, even if the
Law of Secession would have eventually been declared
unconstitutional, it would still retain its legal force, as
unconstitutional union laws did not become invalid per se, but
rather “had to be revoked by the Congress of People’s Deputies.”68
In the end, the NKAO simply violated too many of the Law on
Secession’s requirements to consider their declaration of
independence valid under Soviet Law.69 For example, Article 2 of
the Law on Secession states that the “referendum [must be] held by
secret ballot no sooner than six and no later than nine months after
the adoption of the decision to raise the question of the republic’s
secession from the USSR.”70 For the NKAO, the question was
raised in September 1991 and the referendum was held in December
1991, far short of the six month preparatory period. Even without
65

KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 72

(Russ.).
66 Law on Secession from the USSR, SEVENTEEN MOMENTS IN SOVIET HISTORY (Apr.
3, 1990) at art. 3, http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1991-2/shevarnadze-resigns/shevarnadzeresigns-texts/law-on-secession-from-the-ussr/ [https://perma.cc/7DEG-JM5V].
67 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1977) [KONST. SSSR] [USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 173
(Russ.).
68 Krüger, supra note 11, at 218.
69 See id. at 219.
70 Law on Secession from the USSR, supra note 66, at art. 2.
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the other issues at play, this violation of Article 2 would have been
enough to undermine the NKAO’s bid for independence under the
Soviet Union.
III. Right to Secession under International Law
Although Nagorno-Karabakh’s claims to independence clearly
fall short under an analysis of Soviet law, they may yet have a
successful claim of independence from Azerbaijan under
international law. One source of international law concerning a
nation’s claim for independence is the Charter of the United
Nations.71 Article 1 of the U.N. Charter states that one of the
purposes of the United Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples . . . .”72 Article 55 also mentions
respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples.73
Although this language of support for self-determination in the
United Nations Charter may seem to imply that the United Nations
supports independence for any who seek it, the concept of selfdetermination has been “plagued by difficulties as to scope and
application,” in part because “the drafters of the Charter did not
define self-determination or identify who the ‘peoples’ were.”74 As
commentators such as Antonio Cassese note, “[t]o explore selfdetermination . . . is also a way of opening a veritable Pandora’s box
[because] [i]n every corner of the globe peoples are claiming the
right to self-determination.”75 For both practical and ideological
reasons, the United Nations does not recognize every group seeking
self-determination.76 However, if certain conditions are met, a
preference could develop towards respecting self-determination that
accords with the language of the Charter.
One such set of conditions might provide the NKAO with a

See U.N. Charter art. 1.
Id. at art. 1, ¶2.
73 See id. at art. 55.
74 Marija Batistich, The Right to Self-Determination and International Law, 7
AUCKLAND U. L. REV. 1013, 1018 (1995).
75 MILENA STERIO, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: SELFISTANS, SECESSION, AND THE RULE OF THE GREAT POWERS 2 (2013) (quoting
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 1 (1995)).
76 For example: the Basque separatist movement, Catalonia, Eastern Ukraine,
Kurdistan, and countless others.
71
72
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legitimate claim to independence through remedial secession:
Remedial secession. Remedial secession is a doctrine in which
“international law may recognize a continuum of remedies ranging
from the protection of individual rights, to minority rights ending
with secession as the ultimate remedy.”77 The magnitude of the
remedy is in direct proportion to “the varying degrees of oppression
inflicted upon a particular group by its governing State.”78 In other
words, the more serious the oppression, the more powerful the
remedy.79
One argument repeatedly made in favor of this principle is “that
the saving clause contained in principle 5, paragraph 7, of the
Declaration on Friendly Relations constitutes the legal basis of
remedial secession.”80 This “saving clause” states that:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity
of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in
compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples as described above and thus possessed
of a government representing the whole people belonging to the
territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.81

Some scholars interpret this clause to mean that where a
particular country does not truly represent all of its constituent
members, “[the government] is illegitimate and thus in violation of
the principle of self-determination, and this illegitimate character
serves in turn to [legitimize] ‘action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity’
of the sovereign and independent State.”82
However, such a reading of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations goes beyond its intended meaning, as the language
77 Grace Bolton & Gezim Visoka, Recognizing Kosovo’s Independence: Remedial
Secession or Earned Sovereignty? 1, 3 (South East European Studies at Oxford,
Occasional Paper No. 11/10, 2010).
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 Katherine Del Mar, STATEHOOD AND SELF-DETERMINATION 79, 93 (Duncan
French ed., 2013) (listing commentators who argue that this provision serves as the legal
basis for remedial secession under international law).
81 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), annex (Oct. 24, 1970).
82 Del Mar, supra note 80, at 93-4 (citing LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE
LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 93 (1978)).
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regarding “[n]othing in the foregoing paragraphs . . . demonstrates
that ‘the purpose of the provision is to ensure that no preceding
provision should be construed as authorizing the secession of
territory, and not the opposite meaning.’”83 In other words, the
‘saving clause’ in the Declaration on Friendly Relations is only
meant to clarify the preceding language in the document itself,
rather than grant some new form of secession rights to unhappy
residents of a particular state. Although there is no concept of
remedial secession that might grant a right of independence to
Nagorno-Karabakh vis-à-vis their relationship with Azerbaijan, the
principle of uti possidetis may provide another route to
legitimatized independence.
Uti possidetis, originally recognized in the context of
decolonization, but considered more broadly today, is the principle
that, “in the event of dissolution of a state, the units of that state
come to independence within their former administrative
boundaries.”84 This principle is relevant to the question of NagornoKarabakh. If Karabakh automatically acquired sovereignty upon the
collapse of the Soviet Union, then Azerbaijan’s claims over the
territory would be void.
Unfortunately for the NKAO, however, uti possidetis does not
appear applicable here, because “[b]efore the break-up of the Soviet
Union, Nagorno-Karabakh lay within the administrative borders of
the Azerbaijan SSR.”85 Due to the fact that Azerbaijan held a higher
administrative level within the Soviet Union that NagornoKarabakh, when the Azerbaijan SSR seceded from the Soviet
Union, its “borders were converted, pursuant to the uti possidetis
principle, into the international borders of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, including Nagorno-Karabakh.”86
As a result, pro-independence arguments based on the
international law principle of uti possidetis dovetail closely with the
analysis of independence under Soviet law above. NagornoKarabakh would have a much stronger uti possidetis claim if they
were able to show that their attempts to gain independence from
Azerbaijan under the Soviet Union were successful. Because the
NKAO did not meet the Soviet constitutional requirements for state
83
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secession and were consequently still part of Azerbaijan when the
Soviet Union broke up, they cannot fulfill the requirements for a
legitimate uti possidetis claim.
Although Nagorno-Karabakh has sought to achieve recognition
as a state independent from Azerbaijan, its ineligibility for
independence under both Soviet law and international law seriously
undermines the legitimacy and possible effectiveness of such
claims. Instead, the reality for residents facing day-to-day life in
the contested territory is that whoever commands the most military
power in the region will have the upper hand in the conflict, which
at the moment and for the foreseeable future appears to be Russia.87
Russia benefits from the conflict by providing military aid to both
Armenia and Azerbaijan, conditioned on the potential recipient
acquiescing to strategically important Russian foreign policy
requests, such as the signing of a Commonwealth of Independent
States security pact.88
IV. Future Implications
An important future implication of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict lies in the fact that the region may very well become an
independent state at some point in the future, despite not meeting
the requirements for sovereignty under Soviet law or international
law. If such a result were to occur on the basis of international law
and self-determination, it could undermine international law’s
legitimacy as a neutral arbiter of state conflict because the NKAO’s
claims to independence contravene several principles of
international law.
Certainly, such an outcome could be the result of Azerbaijan
freely deciding to grant independence to Nagorno-Karabakh,
though this seems unlikely given the resources and military lives
Azerbaijan has given in their efforts to hold onto the territory. If
Nagorno-Karabakh were to become independent, it would likely be
the result of a highly successful Armenian military offensive finally
wresting control away from Azerbaijan. However, Armenian
87 See Neil Hauer, Bitter Military Losses Lead to Power Struggle in NagornoKarabakh, RADIOFREEEUROPE/RADIOLIBERTY (Apr. 10, 2021, 8:19 AM),
https://www.rferl.org/a/karabakh-power-struggle-haratiunian-balasanian-russia-armeniaazerbaijan/31196526.html [https://perma.cc/G3FQ-RR3W].
88 See Andrew Sprague, Russian Meddling in Its Near Abroad: The Use of Frozen
Conflicts as a Foreign Policy Tool, 28 INSTITUT BARCELONA ESTUDIS INTERNACIONALS
STUDENT PAPER SERIES 12 (2016), https://www.ibei.org/ibei_studentpaper28_71440.pdf.
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conquest seems as unlikely as Azerbaijani consent, as recent
conflict has only strengthened Azerbaijan’s hold on the region.89
V. Conclusion
If one were to ask Kanum and Volodya Grigoryan their opinions
on Nagorno-Karabakh independence following the forced
expulsion from their house of twenty years, they would probably be
more concerned with being able to live a peaceful, fulfilling life than
exactly which flag flies over the land they called home.
Unfortunately, because the NKAO’s bids for independence under
both the Soviet Union and the current state of Azerbaijan do not
seem legitimate through either Soviet law or international law, it
appears the violent tug-of-war over the territory will continue until
a peaceful settlement can be reached, or one party obtains enough
of a military advantage to end the question of Nagorno-Karabakh
once and for all.

89

Hauer, supra note 87.
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